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Abstract Methods available for the axiomatization of arbitrary finite-valued logics can be
applied to obtain sound and complete intelim rules for all truth-functional connectives of
classical logic including the Sheffer stroke (NAND) and Peirce’s arrow (NOR). The restriction
to a single conclusion in standard systems of natural deduction requires the introduction of
additional rules to make the resulting systems complete; these rules are nevertheless still
simple and correspond straightforwardly to the classical absurdity rule. Omitting these rules
results in systems for intuitionistic versions of the connectives in question.
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1 Introduction
In a recent paper, Hazen and Pelletier (2014) compared Jas´kowski’s (1934) and Gentzen’s
(1934) versions of natural deduction. In Section 2.3 of their paper, Hazen and Pelletier con-
sider Price’s (1961) natural deduction rules for the Sheffer stroke (NAND). These rules are:
[A]....
B |B
A |B |IP
A A |B
B |B |EP
A (B |B) |A
B
||EP
Although these rules are sound and complete for a logic in which | is the only primitive,
they are not of the standard “intelim” form. Hazen and Pelletier attempt to give a Jas´kowski-
Fitch style natural deduction system in Section 3.3 which comes closer to this ideal but find
that their rules do not characterize the classical logic of | except in the attenuated sense that
adding these rules to a standard natural deduction system allows one to prove (A |B)↔
¬(A∧B) (“parasitic completeness”). By themselves, their rules are “ambiguous” between
the two intuitionistic versions ¬(A∧ B) and ¬A∨¬B. They then discuss the framework
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2 Richard Zach
of Schro¨der-Heister’s generalized natural deduction and show that Dosˇen’s ?, which is an
“indigenous Sheffer function” for intuitionistic logic in the sense that every connective can
be expressed in terms of it, can be given intelim rules in this framework. They leave open
the question of how the classical Sheffer stroke should be dealt with in natural deduction,
as well as the status of their proposed rules. The aim of this note is to show how one can
give a natural deduction system of standard intelim rules for the classical Sheffer stroke
and its intuitionistic variants, and to discuss the properties of the resulting systems. It is
of course possible to arrive at the same rules directly; indeed, Read (1999) did so. The
methods presented here, however, are completely general and can be applied to any set of
truth-functional connectives; we sketch this also for Pierce’s arrow (NOR) and exclusive or.
2 Obtaining natural deduction rules
In a series of papers, Baaz et al (1993, 1994); Zach (1993) showed how finite-valued log-
ics can be given sequent calculus axiomatizations based on a simple procedure that yields
introduction rules for each connective and truth value, and where sequents have as many
places as the logic has truth values. They proved completeness, cut-elimination, midsequent
theorem, interpolation, and generalized it to multiple-conclusion natural deduction systems
for finite-valued logics. The natural deduction systems have the normal form property, and
there are translations from natural deduction derivations to sequent calculus proofs and vice
versa. In the case of two-valued classical logic, the construction yields exactly the classi-
cal sequent calculus LK, and a multiple-conclusion system of natural deduction with the
standard introduction rules for ¬, ∧, ∨,→, ∀, and ∃, and “general elimination rules”. This
system is complete for classical logic without the need to add axioms (e.g., A∨¬A) or rules
such as double negation elimination or Prawitz’s ⊥C to Gentzen’s NJ.1
For the Sheffer stroke, this procedure yields sequent calculus rules as follows. The Shef-
fer stroke is a truth-functional connective, and any truth function can be expressed as a
conjunctive normal form of its arguments. We can thus express the conditions under which
a formula of the form A |B is true in terms of a conjunction of disjunctions of A, ¬A, B,
and ¬B. In the same way we can express the conditions under which A | B is false, i.e.,
express ¬(A |B) as a conjunctive normal form.
T A |B is true iff A is false or B is false:
A |B⇔¬A∨¬B
F A |B is false iff A is true and B is true:
¬(A |B)⇔ A∧B
From these normal forms we then directly obtain introduction rules for | in the succe-
dent and antecedent. The normal form for A |B provides the introduction rule for | in the
succedent |R; that for ¬(A |B) the introduction rule for the antecedent |L. In each case, the
conjuncts in the normal form correspond to the premises. In each premise sequent, put the
formula A on the right if it occurs without negation in the corresponding conjunct, and on
1 The general elimination rules coincide with the elimination rules of Parigot’s (1992a) free deduction; he
showed how to obtain the standard elimination rules from them by systematic simplification. A version of
the simplified system of classical multiple-conclusion natural deduction was studied by Parigot (1992b). The
general elimination rules for ∧ and→ were studied by von Plato (2001).
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the left if it occurs negated, and the same for B. Thus, for |R we have one premise since the
conjunctive normal form has just one conjunct ¬A∨¬B, and since A and B are both negated,
A and B both go on the left: A,B `. For |L we have two premises corresponding the the two
(one-element) disjunctions A and B: ` A and ` B. The sequents in the full rule then also
contain the context formulas Γ , ∆ .
A,B,Γ ` ∆
Γ ` ∆ ,A |B |R
Γ ` ∆ ,A Γ ` ∆ ,B
A |B,Γ ` ∆ |L
Let us call the sequent calculus that includes these two rules, the axioms A ` A, and the usual
structural rules (weakening, exchange, contraction on the left and right, as well as cut) LS.
Proposition 1 LS is sound and cut-free complete.
Proof Follows as a special case of Baaz et al (1994, Theorems 3.1, 3.2) and Zach (1993,
Theorems 3.3.3, 3.3.10). uunionsq
Gentzen-style natural deduction rules are obtained from sequent calculus rules by turn-
ing the premises “sideways.” Formulas in the antecedent of a premise become assumptions.
The auxiliary formulas in the antecedent are those that may be discharged in an application
of the rule; the context formulas Γ are suppressed. Formulas in the consequent become the
conclusion of the corresponding premise. For the introduction rules, the premises then are
just the sideways premises of the |R rule. For the elimination rule, the principal formula A |B
in the |L rule becomes an additional premise for the |E rule. The natural deduction rules for |
obtained this way then are:
[A] [B]....
∆
∆ ,A |B |Im
∆ ,A |B ∆ ,A ∆ ,B
∆
|Em
Note that this version of natural deduction allows multiple formulas in the conclusion posi-
tion. Let us refer to this system as NSm, the subscript m for “multiple conclusion.” It requires
structural rules that allow conclusions to be weakened, contracted, and rearranged. As for
all the natural deduction systems constructed in this way, there are simple translations of
proofs in LS into deductions in NSm and vice versa. The system NSm is thus also sound and
complete for the classical Sheffer stroke.
Proposition 2 LS proves a sequent Γ ` ∆ iff NSm derives ∆ from assumptions Γ ′ with
Γ ′ ⊆ Γ .
Proof Follows from the general results in Baaz et al (1993, Theorem 4.7, 5.4) and Zach
(1993, Theorem 4.2.8, 4.3.4). See Prop. 3 below for the translation in this specific case. uunionsq
3 Single-conclusion natural deduction
Natural deduction systems commonly require that each conclusion is a single formula. In
order to obtain rules for a single-conclusion natural deduction system, we begin by intro-
ducing a corresponding restriction into the sequent calculus: the succedent in each sequent
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in a proof must contain at most one formula. This in effect means that the |L, |R, and WR
(weakening-right) rules become:
A,B,Γ `
Γ ` A |B |R
′ Γ ` A Γ ` B
A |B,Γ ` |L
′ Γ `
Γ ` A WR
′
Exchange and contraction on the right are no longer needed. We will refer to the resulting
calculus as LS′.
For the corresponding natural deduction system, we also have to accommodate the
empty sequence of conclusion formulas, i.e., we have to introduce a placeholder symbol ⊥
for the empty conclusion in proofs. The inference rules will be adapted for single conclu-
sions by replacing empty conclusions sequences by ⊥. The single conclusion rules corre-
sponding to |R′, |L′, and WR′ then are:
[A] [B]....
⊥
A |B |I
A |B A B
⊥ |E
⊥
A
⊥I
The ⊥I rule is named as in (Prawitz 1965); Gentzen (1934) did not give a name to the rule.
The special cases where A= B correspond to Gentzen’s ¬I and ¬E rules:
A....
⊥
¬A ¬I
A....
⊥
A |A |I
¬A A
⊥ ¬E
A |A A
⊥ |E
The resulting system NS exactly corresponds to LS′, the sequent calculus where the succe-
dent of each sequent is restricted to at most one formula.2
Proposition 3 NS derives A from assumptions in Γ iff LS′ proves the sequent Γ ` A (or
Γ ` if A=⊥).
Proof We translate each proof in LS′ of Γ ` A into a deduction in NS of A, and one of Γ `
into one of ⊥, where all open assumptions are in Γ . Conversely, any deduction in NS of A
from assumptions Γ can be translated into a proof in LS′ of Γ ` A, or of Γ ` if A=⊥.
Assume LS proves Γ ` A or (or Γ `) via a proof pi . We construct an NS derivation δ of
A (or ⊥) from assumptions Γ ′ ⊆ Γ by induction. If pi only consists of the an axiom A ` A,
then A is a derivation of A (which depends on A). If pi ends in aWR, the conclusion is Γ ` A
and the premise is Γ `. By induction hypothesis, we have a derivation of ⊥ from Γ ′. Add
⊥I with conclusion A to this derivation.
If pi ends in a cut, the last inference is of the form
Γ1 ` A A,Γ2 ` B
Γ1,Γ2 ` B cut
2 The use of the special symbol ⊥ is not strictly necessary, as it could be replaced by explicitly contra-
dictory premises (e.g., C |D, C, and D; or more simply C |C and C) when it appears as a premise, and by an
arbitrary formula when it appears as the conclusion. This has the advantage that the resulting rules mention
no symbols other than |, i.e., are pure. Indeed, this was in part Hazen and Pelletier’s goal and their rules used
this approach. This alternative approach can however not be used if no such “explicit contradiction” can be
expressed. See also Section 7 below.
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By induction hypothesis, we have NS derivations δ1 of A from assumptions in Γ1 and a
derivation of B from assumptions in A, Γ2.
If A is not actually an open assumption in δ2, δ2 already is a derivation of B from
Γ ′2 ⊆Γ1∪Γ2. Otherwise, δ2 does contain undischarged assumptions A. Append the derivation
δ1 of A (with open assumptions Γ ′1 ⊆ Γ1) to all leaves where A is undischarged in δ2. This is
a derivation of B from assumptions Γ ′1 ,Γ
′
2 ⊆ Γ1,Γs.
If pi ends in |R′, the last sequent is Γ ` A |B and the premise is A,B,Γ `. By induction
hypothesis there is a derivation δ1 of ⊥ with open assumptions among A,B,Γ . Add a |I rule
to δ1 and discharge any assumptions of the form A or B.
If pi ends in |L, the last sequent is A |B,Γ ` and the premises are Γ ` A and Γ ` B. By
induction hypothesis we have deductions δ1 of A from Γ1 ⊆ Γ and δ2 of B from Γ2 ⊆ Γ ,
respectively. Use these and an assumption A |B as premises for a |E rule with conclusion ⊥.
The result is a derivation of ⊥ from assumptions A |B,Γ1,Γ2 ⊆ A |B,Γ .
In the other direction we proceed the same way. Derivations consisting of assumptions A
alone are translated into axiom sequents A ` A. Derivations ending in ⊥I result in proofs
ending in WR. If a derivation ends in |I with the premise ⊥ being derived from assumptions
A,B,Γ , by induction hypothesis we have an LS′-proof of A,B,Γ `. Apply |R to obtain a
proof ofΓ `A |B. If a derivation ends in |E, its premises are A |B, A, and B and its conclusion
is⊥. By induction hypothesis, we have NS′-proofs pi1, pi2, pi3 of Γ1 ` A |B, Γ2 ` A and Γ3 ` B
with Γi∪Γ2∪Γ3 = Γ . We obtain a proof of Γ ` ∆ as follows:
.... pi1
Γ1 ` A |B
.... pi2
Γ2 ` A
Γ2,Γ3 ` A
.... pi3
Γ3 ` B
Γ2,Γ3 ` B
A |B,Γ2,Γ3 ` |L
Γ1,Γ2,Γ3 ` cut
uunionsq
4 Intuitionistic Sheffer strokes
It is easily seen that the systems LS′ and NS are not complete. Consider a three-valued
interpretation with truth values ⊥ < I < > with > designated, and consider the following
truth table for |:
A |B ⊥ I >
⊥ > > >
I > ⊥ ⊥
> > ⊥ ⊥
LS′ is sound for this interpretation, i.e., whenever LS′ proves Γ ` A then min{v(A):A ∈
Γ } ≤ v(A), and whenever it proves Γ `, then min{v(A) : A ∈ Γ } = ⊥, for any truth-value
assignment v. Consider (A |A) | (A |A). For the assignment v(A) = I, we have v((A |A) | (A |
A)) = > > v(A), hence the sequent (A |A) | (A |A) ` A is unprovable in LS′. Consequently
there is no NS deduction of A from the only assumption (A |A) | (A |A). This should not be
surprising. If we abbreviate A |A as ¬A, then this amounts to the intuitionistically invalid
inference of double negation elimination, i.e., ¬¬A ` A.
Since LS′ and NS are not complete for the Sheffer stroke the question arises if one can
give a semantics for | relative to which these systems are complete. Indeed this is the case. It
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is again not surprising that a version of intuitionistic Kripke frames can serve this purpose.
This can be obtained by applying a general result about all finite-valued logics due to Baaz
and Fermu¨ller (1996) to the two-valued case and the truth table for |. An intuitionistic Kripke
model is M = 〈W,≤,v〉 where W is a non-empty set of worlds, ≤ is a partial order on W ,
and v is a function from the propositional variables to℘(W ) satisfying p ∈ v(w′) whenever
w≤w′ and p ∈ v(w) (in other words, the interpretation of predicate variables is monotonic).
We then define the satisfaction relation by:
1. M,w  p iff v(p) ∈ w
2. M,w  A |B iff for all w′ ≥ w, either M,w′ 1 A or M,w′ 1 B.
(If one wants to also include other connectives ¬, ∨, ∧, etc., the corresponding standard
satisfaction conditions for them may be added as well. It is then evident that M,w A |B iff
M,w ¬(A∧B) as one would expect.) One can then easily verify soundness, and prove the
following completeness theorem by a version of Schu¨tte’s reduction tree method:
Proposition 4 If LS′ does not prove Γ ` A, then there is a Kripke model M and a world w
so that M,w  B for all B ∈ Γ but M,w 1 A.
Proof See Baaz and Fermu¨ller (1996, Theorem 4.2). uunionsq
If the rules |I, |E are added to NJ instead of being considered on their own, we can also
show completeness by proving that A |B `¬(A∧B) and ¬(A∧B) ` A |B. This is what Hazen
and Pelletier call “parasitic completeness,” but it has one interesting consequence: it shows
that our rules for | in LS (and hence also the intelim rules in NS) are—unlike their rules—
not ambiguous between two different connectives: in LS and NS, | defines the intuitionistic
connective ¬(A∧B).
This of course raises the question: what do Hazen and Pelletier’s rules define, if any-
thing?
Let us use ‖ for the intuitionistic connective introduced by Hazen and Pelletier. Their
rules are formulated for a Jas´kowski-Fitch style natural deduction system in which proofs
(and subproofs) are sequences of formulas with scope of assumptions indicated, and instead
of a primitive ⊥ they make use of “explicit contradictions,” i.e., triples of formulas of the
forms A |B, A, B. In our Gentzen-style framework, their rules can be formulated as follows:
[A]....
⊥
A‖B ‖I1
[B]....
⊥
A‖B ‖I2
A‖B A B
C
‖E
These rules correspond to the intuitionistic sequent rules:
A,Γ `
Γ ` A‖B ‖R
′
1
B,Γ `
Γ ` A‖B ‖R
′
2
Γ ` A Γ ` B
A‖B,Γ ` ‖L
′
The versions ‖R1, ‖R2, ‖L of these rules without the restriction to a single formula in the
succedent are of course equivalent to |L and |R, i.e., in the presence of contraction on the
right, LS plus ‖R1, ‖R2, ‖L proves both (A |B) ` (A ‖B) and (A ‖B) ` (A |B). In the in-
tuitionistic system, i.e., LS′ plus ‖R′1, ‖R′2, ‖′L, only (A ‖ B) ` (A | B) is provable. This
corresponds to the provability in LJ of (¬A∨¬B) ` ¬(A∧ B) and the unprovability of
¬(A∧B) ` (¬A∨¬B).
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However, while | defined by |R′, |L′ characterizes A |B intuitionistically as ¬(A∧B),
‖R′1, ‖R′2, ‖L′ do not, as one might at first glance suspect, intuitionistically define A ‖B as
¬A∨¬B. In other words, ‖R′1, ‖R′2, ‖L′ is not parasitically complete: LJ plus these rules does
not prove (A‖B)` (¬A∨¬B). (This can be shown by appealing to Harrop’s (1960) extended
version of the disjunction property in LJ; see Takeuti 1987, Theorem 6.14 or Troelstra and
Schwichtenberg 2000, Theorem 4.2.3.) Note also that the rules do not suffice to even prove
A‖B ` A‖B from axioms A ` A and B ` B.
In order to complete the calculus so as to obtain these results, one could replace the ‖L
rule with the following two:
A‖A,Γ `C B‖B,Γ `C
A‖B,Γ `C ‖L
′′ Γ ` A
A‖A,Γ ` ¬R
The corresponding natural deduction rules are:3
A‖B
[A]....
C
[B]....
C
C
‖E ′ A‖A A⊥ ¬E
5 Classical single-conclusion systems
We have seen that the intelim rules for | do not by themselves yield a complete natural
deduction system for the classical Sheffer stroke. To obtain a classically complete system
we have to add a new rule |EC which corresponds to the classical ¬E rule (Prawitz’s ⊥C).
¬A....
⊥
A
⊥C
A |A....
⊥
A
|EC
This results in a system NSC complete for the classical interpretation of |. For instance, we
can deduce A from (A |A) | (A |A) as follows:
(A |A) | (A |A) [A |A]1
⊥ |E
A
|EC : 1
Proposition 5 NSC is sound and complete.
Proof Completeness is proved by extending the translation between LS′-proofs and NS-
deductions of Prop 3 to translations between LS′C-proofs and NSC-deductions, where LS
′
C
is the calculus resulting from LS′ by adding the rule
¬A,Γ ` A
Γ ` A |LC
One then also shows, by induction on the height of proofs, that if LS′C proves Γ ,¬∆ ` A then
LS proves Γ ` ∆ ,A, and conversely, if LS proves Γ ` ∆ ,∆ ′ then LS′C proves Γ ,¬∆ ` ∆ ′,
where ∆ ′ may be empty or a single formula. This establishes that LS′C is complete. (See also
Troelstra and Schwichtenberg 2000, Section 3.3.2; our rule |LC plays the role of stability
axioms here.) uunionsq
3 See errata.
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6 Normalization
One important fact about Gentzen’s natural deduction calculus NJ is that it normalizes, i.e.,
every derivation can be transformed into one in which is normal: no formula occurrence is
both the conclusion of an introduction rule and the major premise of an elimination rule.
Such formula occurrences are called maximal formulas. This result was first established
in print by Prawitz (1965). It is proved by showing that maximal formula occurrences can
be eliminated from derivations, one at a time. The result then follows by induction on the
number of maximal formula occurrences in a derivation.
The result also holds for NS, and indeed also for NJ to which we add the |I and |E
rules. All that is required is to provide the reduction for maximal formulas of the form A |B;
the argument of Prawitz (1965, Ch. II) otherwise goes through without change. If a formula
occurrence of the form A |B is maximal in a derivation, the derivation has the form on the
left, and can be transformed into the derivation on the right, in which the maximal formula
occurrence is removed:
[A] [B].... δ1
⊥
A |B |I
.... δ2
A
.... δ3
B
⊥ |E
.... δ2
A
.... δ3
B.... δ1[δ2/A,δ3/B]
⊥
The derivation δ1[δ2/A,δ3/B] is the derivation resulting from δ1 by appending δ2 to all
assumptions of the form A discharged by the |I rule, and δ3 to all such assumptions of the
form B.
Prawitz (1965, Ch. III) also showed that the classical system with intelim rules for ¬,
∧,→, ∀, with ⊥C, but without ∨ and ∃ also has normalization. Prawitz shows that for this
system, we may restrict applications of ⊥C to atomic formulas A. This is done by showing
that any application of ⊥C for a composite formula can be transformed into one where ⊥C
is instead applied to its immediate subformulas. The result then follows by induction on
the complexity of formulas A used in ⊥C inferences. It is this step that does not work for
formulas of the form A∨B or ∃xA(x).
We may extend Prawitz’s result to NSC and to natural deduction systems which include
¬ and its rules including ⊥C directly, or which define ¬A as A |A and use the rules for |,
including |EC. To do this, it suffices to show that the fact mentioned above (i.e., Prawitz’s
Th. 1 of Ch. III) also holds for NS and related systems not including ∨. An application of
|EC applied to A |B in a derivation appears as the subderivation on the left, which can be
replaced by the subderivation on the right (for simplicity, abbreviate C |C by ¬C):
[¬(A |B)]1.... δ
⊥
A |B |EC : 1
[A |B]1 [A]2 [B]2
⊥ |E
¬(A |B) |I : 1.... δ ′
⊥
A |B |I : 2
In δ ′, the assumptions in δ of the form ¬(A |B) which are discharged by the |EC rule are
replaced by the derivations of ¬(A |B) indicated.
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7 Jas´kowski-Fitch and Suppes-Lemmon natural deduction
The natural deduction systems of Jas´kowski (1934) and Fitch (1952) and their variants are
not commonly used for proof-theoretic investigations, but they are the most common sys-
tems of natural deduction appearing in introductory textbooks. They differ from Gentzen-
style single-conclusion natural deduction systems in a number of ways: First, while in
Gentzen-type systems proofs have a tree structure, in Jas´kowski-Fitch style systems they
are linear sequences of formulas, which may however be grouped into possibly nested sub-
proofs. Every subproof begins with an assumption, and subproofs themselves can serve as
premises to inferences. The conclusion of these inferences then no longer depend on the
assumption of the subproof.
In order to obtain a Jas´kowski-Fitch type system for the Sheffer stroke, specifically, to
accommodate the |I rule, we must allow for subproofs to have two assumption formulas,
or alternatively, relax the restriction on subproofs having their last formula not appear in a
nested subproof itself. The corresponding versions of the |I, |E, and |EC rules are as follows:4
A
B
...
⊥
. A |B |I or
A
...
B
...
⊥
. A |B |I
A |B
A
...
⊥
B
...
⊥
. ⊥ |E
A |A
...
⊥
. A |EC
Some presentations of Fitch-style systems lack the ⊥ constant as a primitive, and instead
require the presence of an “explicit contradiction,” i.e., both A and ¬A, when ⊥ appears
as a premise or the last line of a subproof used as a premise. Instead of deriving ⊥ as
a conclusion, the corresponding rules allow the derivation of an arbitrary formula. Rules
which result in such a system (or which can be added to such a system) would be:
A
B
...
C
C |C
. A |B |I
A
...
B
...
C
C |C
. A |B |I
A |B
A
...
C
C |C
B
...
D
D |D
. E |E
A |A
...
C
C |C
. A |EC
4 The |E rules below do not correspond to the natural deduction rules given above. See errata section at
end.
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No relaxation of the syntax is needed in the style of natural deduction due to Suppes
(1957) and Lemmon 1965, where the assumptions on which a formula depends are recorded
in the deduction with the formulas themselves, and discharging of assumptions is done by
allowing formulas to be removed from the assumption list. The rules might be stated as
follows, following Lemmon:
|-Introduction: Given a proof of⊥ from A and B as assumptions, we may derive A |B
as conclusion. The conclusion depends on any assumptions on which ⊥ depends in
its derivation from A and B (apart from A and B).
|-Elimination: Given a proof of A |B, together with a proof of ⊥ from A as assump-
tion and a proof of ⊥ from B as assumption, we may derive ⊥ as conclusion. The
conclusion ⊥ depends on any assumptions on which A | B depends, or on which
⊥ depends in its derivation from A (apart from A), or on which ⊥ depends in its
derivation from B (apart from BA).
Classical |-Elimination: Given a proof of⊥ from A |A as assumption, we may derive
A as conclusion. A depends on any assumptions on which⊥ depends in its derivation
from A |A (apart from A |A).
In these rules we may consider ⊥ primitive, or read it as “a contradiction,” which again
might mean “both C and C |C” if no negation is available.
8 Other connectives
It bears emphasizing that the methods by which we have obtained the rules for | are com-
pletely general and will produce rules for any other truth-functional connective with the
same systematic features. For instance, Pierce’s arrow ↓ or NOR, the dual of the Sheffer
stroke, would be characterized by
T A↓B is true iff A is false and B is false
F A↓B is false iff A is true or B is true
which would result in the sequent rules
A,Γ ` ∆ B,Γ ` ∆
Γ ` ∆ ,A↓B ↓R
Γ ` ∆ ,A,B
A↓B,Γ ` ∆ ↓L
In order to obtain a single-conclusion sequent system we again leave out the side formulas ∆ .
The presence of two formulas on the right in the premise of ↓L is an obstacle for turning this
rule into single-conclusion natural deduction rule. However, we can replace ↓L by two rules
in which the auxiliary formulas A and B appear in the premise only once. By restricting the
succedents to at most one formula, we obtain the following rules:
A,Γ ` B,Γ `
Γ ` A↓B ↓R
Γ ` A
A↓B,Γ ` ↓L1
Γ ` B
A↓B,Γ ` ↓L2
We obtain the single-conclusion natural deduction rules
[A]....
⊥
[B]....
⊥
A↓B ↓I
A↓B A
⊥ ↓E1
A↓B B
⊥ ↓E2
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This natural deduction system, as well as the restricted sequent calculus, are again not clas-
sically complete, but are complete for an intuitionistic version of ↓. They can be made com-
plete for classical ↓ by adding
A↓A....
⊥
A
↓EC
A slightly more complex example would be the XOR connective. Its truth and falsity
conditions are given by:
T A⊕B is true iff (A is true or B is true) and (A is false or B is false)
F A⊕B is false iff (A is false or B is true) and (B is false or A is true)
The corresponding sequent rules are
Γ ` ∆ ,A,B A,B,Γ ` ∆
Γ ` ∆ ,A⊕B ⊕R
A,Γ ` ∆ ,B B,Γ ` ∆ ,A
A⊕B,Γ ` ∆ . ⊕L
Again, the ⊕R rule may be replaced by the two rules
Γ ` ∆ ,A A,B,Γ ` ∆
Γ ` ∆ ,A⊕B ⊕R1
Γ ` ∆ ,B A,B,Γ ` ∆
Γ ` ∆ ,A⊕B ⊕R2
which result in the natural deduction rules
A
[A], [B]....
⊥
A⊕B ⊕I1
B
[A], [B]....
⊥
A⊕B ⊕I2
A⊕B
[A]....
B
[B]....
A
⊥ ⊕E
In this case, ⊕ cannot be used to express ¬. It is thus not clear whether a complete system
can be obtained without adding ¬ as a primitive together with the full classical set of rules
for it.
Finally, the same method can be applied to Scho¨nfinkel’s (1924) quantifier |x, the basis
of his U combinator. A(x) |x B(x) is true iff for every x, not both A(x) and B(x) hold. Sound
and complete sequent calculus rules are
A(a),B(a),Γ ` ∆
Γ ` ∆ ,A(x) |x B(x) |
xR
Γ ` ∆ ,A(t) Γ ` ∆ ,B(t)
A(x) |x B(x),Γ ` ∆ |
xL
which lead to the following intelim rules,
[A(a)] [B(a)]....
⊥
A(x) |x B(x) |
xI
A(a) |x B(a) A(t) B(t)
⊥ |
xE
all of course with the usual eigenvariable conditions on a.
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9 Conclusion
The specific question of how to come up with left and right rules for the Sheffer stroke in the
style of LK, or introduction and elimination rules in the style of NK might seem like a mere
recreational logic puzzle. Nevertheless, the considerations above have highlighted some in-
teresting aspects of sequent calculus and natural deduction. The first is that there are general
methods which generate such rules automatically from their truth tables. Not only are the
resulting systems complete, they also enjoy the same properties (like cut-elimination) as the
standard systems, and transformations from one system to another (such as the translations
between proofs and derivations sketched in Proposition 3) work in both multiple-conclusion
(classical) and single-conclusion (intuitionistic) systems. Our consideration of how to make
a single-conclusion natural deduction calculus classical revealed the importance of the ⊥C
rule in this respect: ¬L allows us to move formulas from the succedent of a sequent to the
right (where they then appear negated), and and ¬E allows us in effect to turn a deriva-
tion of A into one of ⊥ from ¬A. The rules |LC (of the proof of Proposition 5) and ⊥C
enable us to reverse this, i.e., to move negated formulas from the antecedent of a sequent
to the succedent, and to transform a derivation in which ¬A is an open assumption into one
with A instead as the conclusion. This means that the restriction to a single formula on the
right, which corresponds to the restriction to single conclusions in natural deduction, can be
circumvented. The same trick can be used whenever the new connective(s) define(s) ¬ (as
in the case of |), but it can also be used to show how a pair of intelim rules can be made
classically complete by adding rules for ¬ including the ⊥C rule.
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10 Errata
The |E rule of section 7 should read:
A |B
A
B
. ⊥ |E
The rule printed in the text corresponds instead to a special version of the ‖E ′ rule of sec-
tion 4. However, that rule is also incorrect. The ‖E ′ rule corresponding to ‖L′′ is
A‖B
[A‖A]....
C
[B‖B]....
C
C
‖E ′
